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Over the past 30 years, several cross-species transmission events, as well as changes in virus tropism, have
mediated significant animal and human diseases. Most notable is severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
a lower respiratory tract disease of humans that was first reported in late 2002 in Guangdong Province, China.
The disease, which quickly spread worldwide over a period of 4 months spanning late 2002 and early 2003,
infected over 8,000 individuals and killed nearly 800 before it was successfully contained by aggressive public
health intervention strategies. A coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was identified as the etiological agent of SARS, and
initial assessments determined that the virus crossed to human hosts from zoonotic reservoirs, including bats,
Himalayan palm civets (Paguma larvata), and raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), sold in exotic animal
markets in Guangdong Province. In this review, we discuss the molecular mechanisms that govern coronavirus
cross-species transmission both in vitro and in vivo, using the emergence of SARS-CoV as a model. We pay
particular attention to how changes in the Spike attachment protein, both within and outside of the receptor
binding domain, mediate the emergence of coronaviruses in new host populations.
Coronavirus (CoV) phylogeny and biology, as demonstrated
during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epi-
demic in 2002-2003, are likely characterized by frequent host-
shifting events, whether they be animal-to-human (zoonosis),
human-to-animal (reverse zoonosis), or animal-to-animal (26,
44, 67, 115). Over the past 30 years, several coronavirus cross-
species transmission events, as well as changes in virus tropism,
have given rise to significant new animal and human diseases
that implicate bovine coronavirus (BCoV), human coronavirus
OC43 (HCoV-OC43), human coronavirus 229E (HCoV-229E),
canine coronavirus (CCoV), feline coronavirus (FCoV), por-
cine coronavirus (PCoV), and transmissible gastroenteritis vi-
rus (TGEV) (1, 58, 79, 80, 103, 104, 143, 144). Most notably,
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a lower respiratory
tract disease of humans that was first reported in late 2002 in
Guangdong Province, China, quickly spread worldwide over a
period of 4 months spanning late 2002 and early 2003 and
infected over 8,000 individuals, killing nearly 800 before it was
successfully contained by aggressive public health intervention
strategies (25, 69, 101, 102, 160). A coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
was identified as the etiological agent of SARS, and assess-
ments determined that the virus crossed to human hosts, most
likely in southern China in Guangdong Province, from zoo-
notic reservoirs, including bats (74), Himalayan palm civets
(Paguma larvata), and raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides),
the latter two of which are sold in exotic animal markets (44).
In this review, we discuss the pleiotropic molecular mecha-
nisms that govern coronavirus cross-species transmission both
in vitro and in vivo, paying particular attention to SARS-CoV
and SARS-like-CoV transmission events as models, comparing
and contrasting the diversity of mechanisms governing virus
cross-species transmission in outbreak settings.
Coronaviruses are enveloped RNA viruses that infect and
cause disease in a broad array of avian and mammal species,
including humans. They contain the largest single-stranded,
positive-sense RNA genomes currently known, ranging in size
from 27 to nearly 32 kb in length. SARS-CoV, at 29 kb, encodes
nine open reading frames (ORFs) (20, 84, 115). While all CoVs
carry strain-specific accessory genes in their downstream ORFs,
the order of essential genes—the replicase/transcriptase gene
(gene 1), Spike gene (gene 2 in SARS-CoV), envelope gene (gene
4), membrane gene (gene 5), and nucleocapsid gene (gene 9)—is
remarkably conserved (Fig. 1). Within the virion, genome single-
stranded RNA (ssRNA) is encased in a helical nucleocapsid com-
posed of many copies of the nucleocapsid (N) protein. The lipid
bilayer envelope contains three proteins, envelope (E) and mem-
brane (M), which coordinate virion assembly and release, and the
large peplomer, S. Multiple copies of the S glycoprotein decorate
the surfaces of CoV virions, conferring the virus’s characteristic
corona shape. S also serves as the principle mediator of host cell
attachment and entry, utilizing virus- and host-specific cell recep-
tors. For SARS-CoV, the angiotensin 1-converting enzyme 2
(ACE2) molecule has been shown to serve as a receptor (73);
CD209L has been implicated as a coreceptor in entry (57). Re-
ceptor usage, as well as binding of other molecules, varies by
group and even by strain among the coronaviruses (Table 1) (31,
34, 43, 48, 57, 73, 83, 85, 109, 118, 137, 145, 148, 155); however, in
the majority of studies to date, S—in particular the receptor
binding domain (RBD) of S—remains the principal player in
determining host range (10, 30, 110, 117, 134, 135, 138).
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Prior to the identification of SARS-CoV, coronavirus dis-
ease in humans was reported to result in mild upper respira-
tory tract illnesses caused by the two known pathogenic human
coronaviruses (HCoVs), HCoV-229E and HCoV-OC43 (139),
although recent studies have revealed more-serious lower respi-
ratory tract illness, including lethal disease in the elderly (99).
Subsequent to the SARS epidemic, other coronaviruses capable
of causing disease in humans, HCoV-NL63 and HCoV-HKU1,
were identified from archived nasopharyngeal aspirates (140,
151). Infections with these viruses are associated with more-
serious lower respiratory tract infections in infants, children,
and adults, including croup, bronchiolitis, and pneumonia,
though the true burden of the disease, especially in the very
young, is not currently known (131). Increased awareness of
pathogenic human coronaviruses led to an escalation in re-
search regarding their persistence in reservoir hosts, the mo-
lecular mechanisms governing their emergence and pathogen-
esis in the human population, and the factors required for
successful vaccine and therapeutic interventions. These re-
search pursuits are of particular merit when considered along-
side the increasing awareness that coronaviruses can appar-
ently breach cell type, tissue, and host species barriers with
relative ease (1, 6, 22, 58, 79–81, 97, 103, 120, 121, 125, 143,
144).
This review summarizes the structure and function of the
type I fusion protein S, which mediates docking and entry into
cells, speculating on how shuffling various S moieties between
virus strains and groups may lead to host range expansion;
investigates other alleles that may govern coronavirus cross-
species transmission in cell culture and in vivo; discusses the
possible molecular mechanisms governing the migration of
SARS-CoV from zoonotic reservoirs into the human popula-
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of SARS-CoV genome and civet and bat strain conservation. (Top) SARS-CoV genome is shown, with
ORF1a/ORF1b proteolytic sites indicated by vertical bars and arrows. Nonstructural protein (nsp) numbers are indicated above. The color of the
arrows corresponds to the proteinase responsible for cleavage: red, papain-like proteinase (PLP); blue, 3C-like proteinase (3CLpro). ORFs 2 to
9 are indicated by individual boxes. Coronavirus-conserved proteins are indicated as follows: ORF2, Spike (S); ORF 4, Envelope (E); ORF5,
Membrane (M); ORF 9a, Nucleocapsid (N). Sizes are approximately to scale. (Middle and bottom) Degree of conservation, protein-by-protein,
compared to SARS-CoV (strain Urbani) is indicated by color. A color scale, with conservation expressed in percentages, is shown at the bottom.
All comparisons represent degrees of conservation of amino acids and nucleotides, which are approximately equal, with the exceptions of ORF3
and ORF8. In these cases, amino acid conservation is indicated by the color in the top of the box, and nucleotide conservation is indicated by the
color in the bottom of the box.
TABLE 1. Coronavirus receptor usage
Virus (abbreviation) Group Receptora Other molecules that may be bound References
Human coronavirus 229E (HCoV-229E) 1 APN 141
Feline coronavirus (FCoV) 1 APN 125
Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) 1 APN Sialic acid 28, 109
Canine coronavirus (CCoV) 1 APN 125
Human coronavirus NL63 (HCoV-NL63) 1 ACE2 45
Murine hepatitis virus (MHV) 2 CEACAM1a Sialic acid 31, 100
SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 2 ACE2 DC-SIGN, DC-SIGNR, LSECtin 40, 54, 69, 78
Human coronavirus OC43 (HCoV-OC43) 2 Unknown Sialic acid 131
Avian infectious bronchitis virus (IBV) 3 Heparan sulfateb (Beaudette strain) Sialic acid 76, 134
a Abbreviations: APN, aminopeptidase N; ACE2, angiotensin 1-converting enzyme 2; CEACAM1a, carcinoembryonic cell adhesion molecule 1a.
b It is not known for sure whether heparan sulfate is the receptor.
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tion; visits the concept of viral persistence as a mechanism for
host range expansion; and explores receptor-independent en-
try as an alternative pathway for cross-species transmission. In
this context, we will employ SARS-CoV as a model to outline
the current state of knowledge regarding the molecular deter-
minants of species-specific receptor engagement. The routine
nature of viral cross-species transmission in the coronavirus
family brings up the question of the likelihood of another
emergence event of a pathogenic human coronavirus and un-
derscores the need to continue zoonotic surveillance and re-
search centered around developing therapeutics and vaccines
capable of neutralizing or preventing infection with and spread
of these promiscuous viruses.
THE SPIKE GLYCOPROTEIN: SHUFFLING MOIETIES
WITHIN A CLASS I FUSION PROTEIN
At 180 kDa in mass and visible in electron micrographs as
a 20-nm projection from the virion surface, the S glycoprotein
is second only to the replicase protein nonstructural protein 3
(nsp3) as the largest mature protein produced during corona-
virus infections. SARS S glycoprotein, which forms a trimer in
the virion, is organized into two subunit domains, an amino-
terminal S1 domain, which contains the 200-amino-acid (aa)
RBD, and a carboxy-terminal S2 domain, which contains the
putative fusion peptide, two heptad repeat (HR) domains, and
a transmembrane (TM) domain. This domain organization
groups the CoV Spike protein with other class I viral fusion
proteins, such as influenza virus hemagglutinin (HA), HIV-1
Env, simian virus 5 (SV5) F, and Ebola virus Gp2 (16) (Fig. 2).
The RBD of the Spike protein is generally acknowledged as
the principal determinant of host range (30, 110, 117, 134, 135,
138) and will be described in further detail later in this review.
Recent studies have implicated moieties within the CoV S2
region in host range expansion. A murine hepatitis virus
(MHV) variant isolated from a persistent infection of murine
astrocytoma delayed brain tumor (DBT) cells evidenced ex-
panded usage of the human carcinoembryonic antigen-related
cellular adhesion molecule (hCEACAM) rather than the mu-
rine CEACAM (mCEACAM) as a receptor. When the variant
was sequenced, of the 13 mutations identified in the Spike-
coding region, 6 were in the S2 subunit. Of those six, two were
in the fusion peptide and two in heptad repeat 1 (HR1). Inter-
estingly, when the S2 mutations were introduced in the wild-type
(wt) MHV background, mCEACAM-mediated infectivity was se-
verely hampered. Conversely, the mutations identified in the S1
domain did not substantially alter infectivity (89); rather, combi-
nations of four S2 residue alterations mediated host range expan-
sion. In another study, it was demonstrated that paired mutations
in the HR1 domain and fusion peptide of a heparan sulfate
binding variant of MHV were sufficient to abolish mCEACAM
dependence, effectively extending host range (30).
Other viruses encoding class I fusion proteins have exhibited
alterations in host range following mutation of their fusion
subunits. An antiviral escape mutant of the retrovirus avian
sarcoma and leukosis virus (ASLV) containing mutations in
the HR1 region of the envelope TM subunit (analogous to the
CoV S2 subunit) gained the ability to infect nonavian cells (2).
Interestingly, in three separate analyses of experimental evo-
lution, H3-type influenza viruses selected for similarly mapping
mutations in the globular bases of their HA2 subunits when
adapting the human H3N2 virus to mice (61), as well as when
analyzing the avian progenitor’s (H3N8) leap to humans (45)
and adaptation to dogs (100) (Fig. 2). Although identification
of the mechanism remains uncertain, mutations in and around
the heptad repeats and fusion cores of viruses encoding class I
fusion glycoproteins potentially represent an underappreciated
yet conserved pathway for virus cross-species transmission.
Recent work suggests, in fact, that the separate moieties of
Spike, including both the S1 and S2 subunits, may possess a
degree of interchangeability that could influence host range.
An elegant coronavirus reverse genetics system that has proven
especially efficient in introducing mutations in CoV genome
regions 3 of ORF1 depends on the tropism-altering inter-
changeability of the Spike ectodomain and the intrinsic facility
of coronavirus-targeted recombination (29). Further, the loca-
tions of receptor binding domains in other coronaviruses hint
at modularity; the MHV RBD is located at the very N terminus
of the S1 domain, whereas the 229E RBD is located at the C
terminus of S1 (15, 18, 63, 75), suggesting the possibility that
these domains were acquired by distinct, disparate recombina-
tion events. Additionally, in our recent reconstruction of the
bat SARS-like CoV (Bat-SCoV), we were able not only to
replace the RBD of Bat-SCoV with the human equivalent in
order to generate infectious progeny but also to generate a
recombinant human virus (Bat-F) in which the 3 5,700 nucle-
otides (nt), including the S-coding sequence 3 of the RBD,
were replaced with those from the Bat-SCoV sequence (10).
Both mutants were infectious in primate cells, suggesting an
as-yet-undefined plasticity and perhaps a modular design in the
Spike protein-coding sequence that allows for robust inter-
change of component parts. In particular, substitutions of en-
tire functional cassettes of S1 and S2 may play pivotal roles in
mediating CoV host range expansion, and this trend may ex-
FIG. 2. Comparison of class I viral fusion proteins. Examples of
class I viral fusion proteins, including influenza HA, retrovirus Enve-
lope, and the coronavirus Spike, are shown schematically, with the N
terminus to the left and the C terminus to the right. The viral mem-
brane is indicated by two dashed, vertical blue lines. Protein domains
shown are as follows: fusion peptide, red; heptad repeat 1 (HR1), teal;
heptad repeat 2 (HR2), dark blue; and CoV Spike receptor binding
domain (RBD), purple. Proteolytic cleavage sites are indicated by
orange triangles, and the names of subsequent subunits are indicated
at the appropriate side of each triangle. Sizes and locations of domains
are approximately to scale. The locations of identified mutations as-
sociated with host range expansion are indicated by red asterisks for
point mutations and blue tildes () for large domain swaps either
within the RBD (purple box) or in the context of the rest of the protein
(purple dashed line). References for each study are indicated in the
text.
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tend to other viral class I fusion proteins as well. Additional
research is needed to illuminate the fundamental mechanisms
governing S2-mediated host range expansion both in vitro and
in vivo as well as the phylogenetic constraints on S domain
interchangeability. Defining this aspect of CoV genetics will
contribute to our understanding of viral phylogeny, may help
better predict the emergence of new strains, and could facili-
tate the design of cross-strain therapeutic reagents.
ALLELIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SARS-CoV SPECIES
SPECIFICITY: THE SPIKE RBD
Molecular evolution during the 2002–2003 outbreak and the
subsequent mutational analyses of animal and human SARS-
CoV strains revealed the presence of key mutational hotspots.
Between Bat-SCoVs and civet and human SARS-CoVs, re-
gions of high mutation include those of nsp3, a cleavage prod-
uct from the ORF1a polyprotein, Spike, ORF3, and ORF8
(Fig. 1) (26). When multiple isolates of civet and human
SARS-CoVs were compared in detailed analyses, a key region
likely to influence host range was identified, namely, the Spike
RBD. Coronavirus Spike RBDs are virus specific, discrete,
independently folded regions responsible for interfacing with
the viral receptor. Many RBDs have been described, including
the RBD for SARS-CoV, whose structure in complex with
human ACE2 has been solved (5, 15, 63, 72, 150). These
regions vary in size, though they are usually between 180 and
330 amino acids in length, and they vary in their positions in
the Spike S1 domain (75). Comparison of Spike RBD se-
quences from civets, as well as from early-phase and late-phase
human infections, presents evidence that the RBD experi-
enced an increase in the population frequency of fit alleles
(positive selection) in civet and early-phase human isolates and
a decrease in allelic diversity via selection against less fit or
deleterious alleles (negative selection) in late-phase human
isolates (26, 52). Across the RBD, only 6-amino-acid residues
differ between civet and human isolates (Fig. 3) (26, 44, 59, 78,
102, 107, 115, 125, 147). Of these residues, four are located in
the receptor-binding motif (RBM), the loop region of the
RBD (residues 424 to 494 in human isolates) that contains 13
of the 14 residues that interface with ACE2 (T402 is N-termi-
nal to the RBM). Of the four RBM residues, three are ACE2
interface residues (72).
Surface plasmon resonance binding studies of four Spike S1
residues (344, 360, 479, and 487, the latter two of which are in
the RBM of the RBD) demonstrated that (i) binding efficiency
of an SZ3 (civet isolate) RBD-Ig to ACE2 is more than 30,000-
fold less efficient, (ii) incorporation of either civet RBD resi-
due 479 or 487 into the human RBD results in an approxi-
mately 20- to 30-fold decrease in binding efficiency, and (iii)
incorporation of either civet residue 344 or 360 results in
little-to-no loss of binding efficiency. Coordinately, incorpora-
tion of human residues 479 and 487 into a civet RBD Spike-
pseudotyped virus enhanced infection of cells expressing hu-
man ACE2, while incorporation of civet residues 479 and 487
into a civet RBD Spike-pseudotyped virus abolished infection
of cells expressing human ACE2 (76, 107).
Notably, RBDs constructed from TOR2 (late-phase hu-
man, identical to Urbani in the RBD), GZ02 (early-phase
human) and civet isolates all bound civet ACE2, while only
human isolates bound human ACE2 (50, 76). Paired with the
observation that some civet RBD sequences utilize the human
amino acid at both residues 479 and 487, it is reasonable to
speculate that substitutions in the RBD that increased human
ACE2 binding affinity occurred in the palm civet host. This
speculation is strengthened by structure model studies demon-
FIG. 3. Comparison of SARS-like CoV Spike RBD variations.
Spike RBD residues that are not conserved in comparison to the
human strain are indicated by amino acid residue number (the RBD
corresponds to human amino acid residues 319 to 518). Residues that
are considered part of the receptor binding motif (RBM), the cassette
containing the 14 residues that interact with human ACE2 (hACE2),
are highlighted in red. RBM residues that have been identified as
direct hACE2-interacting residues are numbered in black. Residues
that vary from those of the human strain sequence are highlighted in
blue. Residues that are absent in comparison to those of the human
sequence are highlighted in yellow. The strains shown are as follows:
BSCoV RP3, bat SARS-like CoV strain RP3; A031, a raccoon dog
strain; HC/SZ/61/03 and SZ16, civet strains; GD03, a postepidemic
human strain that clusters phylogenetically with civet strains (possible
reemergent strain); GZ02, early-phase human strain; CUHK-W1, mid-
dle-phase human strain; and SARS-CoV, human late-phase epidemic
Urbani strain.
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strating that stepwise substitution at residues 479 and 487 en-
hanced RBD-human ACE2 (hACE2) interaction in vitro, pos-
sibly by eliminating unfavorable charges in the RBD-receptor
interface (71). Interestingly, models predicted these changes
would have no effect on civet ACE2 (cACE2) affinity.
The importance of proper RBD-ACE2 interfacing was dem-
onstrated in our laboratory in a study in which SARS-CoVs
expressing either a wild-type civet Spike or a mutated civet
Spike containing the human residue at position 479 (icSZ16-S
K479N) were constructed (121). Although the parent SZ16
viruses were incapable of replicating in Vero cells or mouse
cells expressing hACE2, icSZ16-K479N replicated poorly in
Vero cells and was capable of recognizing the hACE2 as a recep-
tor. Serial passage on human airway epithelial cells (HAEs) rap-
idly selected for evolved viruses, icSZ16-S K479 D8 and
icSZ16-S K479 D22, which exhibited enhanced growth on
HAEs and DBT-hACE2 cells. The D8 and D22 variants re-
tained their mutations at residue 479, and while no changes at
residue 487 were noted, two additional interface residues were
altered, Y442F and L472F. Homology modeling studies of
these variants suggested that incorporation of these variant
residues resulted in the achievement of more-efficient RBD-
hACE2 interactions but inefficient recognition of cACE2.
Other studies have further implicated the RBD and its crit-
ical ACE2 interface as the prime barrier to host infection for
SARS-like coronaviruses. Bat-SCoV-Spike-expressing pseudotyped
viruses were unable to infect cells expressing bat, civet, or
human ACE2 receptors, while pseudotyped viruses expressing
Bat-SCoV-Spike containing the human RBD were able to in-
fect hACE2-expressing cells (111). In our laboratory, full-
length Bat-SCoV RNA was replication competent but not in-
fectious when transfected into Vero cells (10). However, as
described above, replacement of the equivalent bat RBD res-
idues (Spike amino acids 323 to 505) with the human RBD
residues 319 to 518 in the context of the infectious cDNA
(Bat-SRBD virus) was sufficient to restore infectivity in Vero
cells, though virus with replacement of the RBM alone repli-
cated but was not infectious. Remarkably, while this virus also
replicated in the aged BALB/c in vivo mouse model, incorpo-
ration of a single amino acid substitution, Y436H (Bat-SRBD-
MA), previously shown to enhance replication and pathogen-
esis in mice (113), also significantly enhanced replication of
Bat-SRBD-MA in mice (10). Homology modeling of the sub-
stitution against a predicted structure of mouse ACE2 (mACE2)
indicated an enhanced interface of the chimeric RBD with the
mACE2 receptor. Thus, clear evidence for SARS-CoV track-
ing along ACE2 receptor orthologs was established by these
studies, especially between civet and human hosts. However,
the receptor for Bat-SCoV in bats remains unclear. It is pos-
sible that the immediate progenitor for the SARS-CoV epi-
demic strain has not been identified; alternatively, recombina-
tion insertion of variant RBDs may have mediated the initial
cross-species transmission event from bats into other mam-
mals.
The significance of the Spike-ACE2 interface is also illus-
trated in neutralizing-antibody analyses and neutralization es-
cape studies. When sera collected from 2002–2003 (epidemic)
convalescent human patients and sera from civets captured in
2004 were assessed against Tor2 (mid-phase epidemic strain)
and GD03 (late-phase isolate) infections, 2002–2003 sera more
efficiently neutralized Tor2, and civet sera more efficiently neu-
tralized GD03. Multiple neutralizing epitopes have been iden-
tified, and the majority of these residues lie within the RBD,
specifically within the RBD-ACE2 interface (114, 128, 136,
162). Interestingly, two separate studies detailed the identifi-
cation of neutralization escape SARS-CoV mutants with com-
pensatory changes in the RBD interface region that could be
subsequently neutralized by synergistic application of antibod-
ies binding noncompeting epitopes, one of which was in S2 (91,
133), suggesting that the evolution of the RBD under the
selective pressure of the antibody elicits both proximal and
distal changes in Spike sequence and structure.
POLYMERASE ERROR RATE AND HOMOLOGOUS




Consideration of the nature of the coronavirus polymerase
and its replication strategy immediately suggests many possible
molecular mechanisms these viruses might employ to alter cell,
tissue, and species tropisms. The following paragraphs will
discuss three major mechanisms that were either likely or pos-
sibly employed in SARS-CoV emergence in the human popu-
lation as a model for the field: polymerase error rate, homol-
ogous recombination, and persistence.
As RNA viruses, coronaviruses encode an RNA-dependent
RNA polymerase (RdRp) to catalyze the production of new
viral RNA. In vitro studies have estimated the error rates of
similar polymerases at 103 to 105 mutations per nucleotide
(nt) per replication cycle (33, 49). It has been shown that
coronaviruses encode a contingent of putative and confirmed
RNA-processing and -editing enzymes that are speculated to
increase the fidelity of the RdRp, presumably due to the un-
usually large sizes of coronavirus genomes (11–13, 24, 41, 53–
55, 60, 90, 119, 124). Importantly, abolition of the activity of
one of these processing enzymes, the exonuclease N activity
(ExoN) encoded within nsp14 of ORF1 in murine hepatitis
virus (MHV), resulted in a loss of polymerase fidelity of almost
10-fold compared to that for RNA isolated from plaque-form-
ing wild-type and mutant viruses (error rates of 2.5  106 and
3.2  105, respectively), suggesting that the intrinsic corona-
virus RdRp fidelity, in the absence of RNA proofreading ac-
tivities, is in the range of that determined for other RdRps in
vitro. SARS-CoV mutants lacking ExoN activity have exhibited
similar results (L. D. Eckerle, M. M. Becker, R. L. Graham,
R. S. Baric, and M. R. Denison, unpublished data). In addition,
little is known about the influence of selective pressure, either
negative or positive, upon the fidelity of the coronavirus poly-
merase complex. In vitro, serial passage of MHV in progres-
sively mixed cultures of nonpermissive and permissive cells
resulted in the isolation of a variant with a disproportionate
number of mutations in S2 and hemagglutinin esterase (HE),
suggesting that passage environment influences rate and selec-
tion (8). Molecular evolution studies comparing human iso-
lates place the SARS-CoV RdRp mutation rate in the range of
106 per nucleotide per replication cycle (82, 141). Broader
studies that incorporated animal isolates noted that the muta-
tion rate slowed across the span of the epidemic but did not
3138 MINIREVIEW J. VIROL.
reach equilibrium, suggesting that fidelity may have relaxed in
favor of adaptation to a new species of host (26, 156); put
another way, the greater selective pressures encountered dur-
ing host species switches may have favored a lower level of
RdRp fidelity.
Although the mechanism is unclear, these observations sug-
gest that ExoN activity and overall RNA polymerase fidelity
may be diminished in alternative host cell backgrounds and/or
virus growth in periods of ecologic stress. Alterations of mu-
tation rates, including site-specific mutation rates, in response
to environment have been observed in multiple bacterial sys-
tems, including Escherichia coli, Haemophilus influenzae, Neis-
seria meningitidis, Helicobacter pylori, and Staphylococcus au-
reus (9, 35, 86, 87, 112, 146). Interestingly, for many of these
examples, analysis of the emergence patterns of mutated iso-
lates suggests the action of more-directed mechanisms than
simply a stochastic selective process. Notably, with the excep-
tions of mutational hotspots in nsp3, Spike, ORF3, and ORF8,
the majority of mutations between Bat-SCoVs and SARS-CoV
isolates consist of point mutations (67, 74, 110), some or most
of which may have arisen simply from polymerase fidelity er-
rors that were perpetuated as replication-neutral mutations;
alternatively, some mutations may have arisen as a more di-
rected response to altered selective pressures on the viral ge-
nome. The current data suggest that the effect of nsp14 ExoN
function on polymerase fidelity should be evaluated in the
context of cross-species transmission and disease emergence.
Analysis of the SARS-CoV genome yields clues that the
virus may have employed mechanisms beyond fidelity error,
however. Coronaviruses have demonstrated a marked capacity
to employ homologous recombination, a process by which vi-
ruses exchange genetic material in the context of a coinfection
(65, 66). This process often takes advantage of the transcrip-
tion regulatory network (TRN), a virus-specific series of 5- to
7-nt sequences (transcription regulatory sequences, or TRSs)
situated at the 5 end of each ORF that function to facilitate
the incorporation of the viral leader sequence on subgenomic
RNAs in the context of normal infection (7, 65, 116, 157).
Multiple lines of evidence implicate homologous recombina-
tion and host shifting in the phylogenetic history of SARS-
CoV. An initial study immediately following the 2003 epidemic
used Bayesian, neighbor-joining, and split decomposition ana-
lyses to determine that the SARS-CoV genome exhibited signs
of a mosaic ancestry, with the 5 end of the genome (the
replicase/transcriptase gene) showing mammalian ancestry and
the 3 end (excluding Spike) showing avian ancestry. Although
controversial (42), analysis of the Spike gene showed evidence
of a mosaic combination of mammalian and avian character-
istics (126), with a high level of identity to feline infectious
peritonitis virus (FIPV), except for an 200-nt region from nt
2472 to nt 2694, which shows a higher level of identity with
avian infectious bronchitis virus (IBV). Subsequent studies
have substantiated and expanded upon this initial observation
(56, 93, 158). In fact, there is evidence of at least seven poten-
tial regions of recombination in the SARS-CoV genome in the
replicase- and Spike-coding regions, with possible recombina-
tion partners that include porcine epidemic diarrhea virus
(PEDV), transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), bovine
coronavirus (BCoV), HCoV-229E, MHV, and IBV (158). Of
note, analysis of Bat-SCoV sequences has led to speculation
that Bat-SCoV may have originated from a recombination
event between the ORF1- and ORF2 (Spike)-coding se-
quences and that this recombination event may have occurred
about 4 years before the SARS epidemic (51). A similar study
involving the human coronavirus HCoV-NL63 likewise dem-
onstrated that HCoV-NL63 exhibited signs of having arisen
from multiple recombination events from its nearest relative
over the course of hundreds of years (106). Further, a recent
study identified a group 1 bat CoV that shared ancestry with
HCoV-229E, which diverged about 200 years ago (104). The
results of these studies lead us to speculate that some, if not all,
human CoVs may have diverged from bat ancestors. Efforts to
gather empirical support for these bioinformatic studies are
currently under way. While the exact phylogenetic origins and
timeline of SARS-CoV emergence are as yet unknown, it
seems clear from the available evidence that the genome that
successfully infected humans may have been shaped in part by
mutation and recombination events over an undetermined
amount of time and in an as-yet-unidentified number of host
species. Clearly, multiple empirical studies indicate that re-
combinant genomes are viable even across group 1 and 2
genealogies, especially in S (8, 10, 88), and that recombination
is shaping the population genetic structure of coronaviruses
(28) and likely influencing host range expansion.
VIRAL PERSISTENCE: EMPLOYING STEALTH AS A
FACTOR FOR EXPANDING HOST RANGE
Many coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV, are accom-
plished at establishing and maintaining persistent infections in
vitro (6, 21, 23, 97, 98, 154). In cell culture, persistent infections
favor carrier cultures in which receptor expression is down-
regulated, selecting for the emergence of virus variants with
mutations that alter either the affinity for the receptor or allow
for recognition of new receptors for docking and entry into
cells. Early MHV studies demonstrated that persistence re-
sulted in a rapid accumulation of mutations in Spike, notably in
the fusion core of the S2 domain, that were sufficient to alter
cell type specificity or receptor affinity (6). Based on these
studies, we speculate that altered cell and tissue tropism fol-
lowing establishment of persistence may be followed subse-
quently by host range expansion. This phenomenon may be
due to one mechanism or a combination of two mechanisms:
homologue scanning and receptor/coreceptor shift. In the first
mechanism, homologue scanning, gradual accumulation of
mutations that enhance or alter Spike affinity for the receptor
or homologues of the receptor in the persistent cell type, may
foster increased affinity for an orthologous receptor molecule
in a different species host. Such a model appears to have been
employed in the evolution of group 1 coronaviruses (such as
HCoV-229E), many of which employ corresponding orthologs
of aminopeptidase N (APN) as cellular receptors (138), as well
as by zoonotic SARS-CoV in its recognition of human ACE2
receptors (120, 121). Examples of other virus families that alter
host range by recognition of receptor orthologs include heni-
paviruses (17) and arenaviruses (108), among others. In the
second mechanism, receptor/coreceptor shift, gene acquisition,
and/or mutation accumulation may drive the virus to recognize
a completely different receptor or to require the additional
recognition of a coreceptor for efficient cell entry. Examples of
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such include MHV strains that express the hemagglutinin es-
terase protein, which require sialic acid interactions in addition
to CEACAM interactions to efficiently infect cells in vitro (37).
Additional data implicate cell surface molecules other than
ACE2, such as DC-SIGN (CD209), L-SIGN (CD209L), and
LSECtin (43, 57, 85) (see Table 1), in cell engagement, and
alterations in primary receptor affinity may enhance the re-
quirement for receptor engagement cofactors for viral entry
and thus effectively “switch” host receptor requirements and
host range.
Both mechanistic possibilities are compelling when consid-
ering the evolution of the SARS-CoV receptor response. Civet
and human orthologs of ACE2 have been shown to function as
receptors for human and civet SARS-CoV isolates and are
sufficient to confer permissiveness to nonpermissive cells, sup-
porting the idea that coronaviruses often traffic along receptor
orthologs during cross-species transmission (73, 76, 120).
However, a recent study demonstrated that expression of
the Rhinolophus pearsonii (Pearson’s horseshoe bat) ACE2
ortholog did not allow either SARS-CoV- or Bat-SCoV-
Spike-pseudotyped viruses to enter cells (111). It has long
been known that many species of bats serve as reservoirs for
a variety of viruses without displaying clinical signs of infection,
in effect existing in a state of persistent infection with the
tenant virus (130), and it is interesting to note that while
antibody- and RNA-positive bats did not exhibit clinical signs
of SARS-like disease, humans and civets infected with SARS-
CoV developed distinct signs of infection (62, 64, 67, 74, 153).
The roles of the bat reservoir in the perpetuation and evolution
of endemic and epidemic coronavirus infections, as well as
receptor usage in bat populations, are and should continue as
subjects of current study.
AN ALTERNATIVE PATHWAY FOR CROSS-SPECIES
TRANSMISSION: RECEPTOR-INDEPENDENT ENTRY?
Even with a host of molecular tools at their disposal to alter
receptor specificity, coronaviruses occasionally appear to ex-
hibit the ability to circumvent receptor-dependent entry en-
tirely. The murine coronavirus strain JHM (MHV-JHM or
MHV4), which encodes a highly fusogenic Spike protein, is
capable of infecting cells via cell-to-cell spread mechanisms
that apparently forego known receptor-dependent entry pro-
cesses (38, 39). MHV-JHM was also shown to lethally infect
CEACAM/ mice, a phenotype that was mapped specifically
to the JHM strain Spike protein (92). These results suggest one
of two possibilities. The first is that receptor-switching events
are occurring, resulting in the use of a new receptor/coreceptor
that is not known. This possibility is certainly compatible with
what has already been discussed in this review regarding po-
tential Spike modularity and the virus’s propensity for recom-
bination. A second, and perhaps more speculative, possibility is
that the higher the fusogenic potential of the Spike protein, the
less the virus may depend on its receptor for cell entry. Results
in our laboratory, which mapped host cell permissiveness
changes for MHV strain A59 to changes in the Spike heptad
repeat region, further hint at this possibility (89). It is reason-
able to speculate that changes in the HR regions of a class I
fusion protein, while not altering receptor specificity per se,
may sufficiently alter the presentation of the fusion pep-
tide-HR complex so that it is capable of fusing with an ex-
panded range of cell types and possibly any cell it encounters,
whether or not it expresses an appropriate receptor. Empirical
studies exploring this possibility are indicated as potentially
broadly relevant to many other viral type 1 fusion glycopro-
teins.
THE EMERGENCE OF SARS-CoV: ZOONOTIC
CONDUITS AND RESERVOIRS
The emergence of SARS-CoV in the human population
constitutes a prime real-world example of an RNA virus uti-
lizing its molecular capabilities to alter its host range. Reports
of the earliest cases of SARS in Guangdong involved employ-
ees of exotic meat markets in the province. Infected individuals
tended to handle animals that were only recently captured
from the wild and were consumed as delicacies by affluent
individuals (75, 122, 161). Subsequent analyses of nasal and
fecal samples from wild-caught animals identified Himalayan
palm civets (Paguma larvata) and raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes
procyonoides) as potential reservoirs by both reverse transcrip-
tion (RT)-PCR and immunoblotting (44). Of the two candi-
date species, civets garnered special interest because of the
capacity of SARS-CoV RNA to persist in infected animals for
more than 2 weeks following initial infection (153). Moreover,
infections identified subsequent to the control of the primary
SARS epidemic were associated with restaurants that prepared
and served civet meat (77, 125, 147), and culling of civets vastly
reduced the numbers of infected animals in Guangdong mar-
ketplaces (160).
However, multiple observations suggested that palm civets
were simply conduits rather than the fundamental reservoirs of
SARS-CoV-like viruses in the wild. RT-PCR studies compar-
ing marketplace civets with civets in the wild determined that
marketplace civets were disproportionately positive for viral
RNA (59). Also, comparisons of genome sequences from var-
ious civet isolates revealed ongoing mutation, suggesting that
the virus was still adapting to the civet rather than persisting in
equilibrium, as would be expected in a reservoir species (59,
125). In fact, mutational analysis identified at least two sepa-
rate transmission events that occurred between palm civets and
humans: one during the main SARS epidemic in 2002-2003
and one during a series of sporadic infections that occurred in
the winter of 2003-2004 (125). Comparisons of human versus
civet isolates revealed over 99.6% nucleotide identity (122)
(Fig. 1). Sequence analyses of human isolates from the late
phase of the SARS epidemic indicated that negative selection
was occurring in the Spike gene. However, calculations indi-
cated that the Spike gene underwent positive selection during
early civet-to-human transmission (52, 156). Finally, analysis of
samples taken from a healthy human cohort in Hong Kong in
2001 revealed the presence of antibodies against SARS-like
viruses in 1.8% of the study population. Interestingly, most
positive samples were positive to antibodies against animal
isolates rather than human isolates. These observations suggest
that substantial numbers of people may have been exposed to
SARS-like viruses at least 2 years prior to the SARS epidemic
(159). Taken together, these observations suggest that palm
civets did not serve as the primary reservoirs of SARS-CoV-
like viruses from the 2002-2003 epidemic. Indeed, passage
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studies on HAE cultures of SARS-CoV isolates expressing
civet ACE2 molecules selected for strains that recognized only
the human receptor, leading to the hypothesis that the civet/
human transmission cycle had been selected over several years,
while the virus pool in both populations was maintained (121).
This finding further implicates a common progenitor reservoir
that was neither human nor civet.
In 2005, two groups independently reported the identifica-
tion of SARS-CoV-like RNA sequences and anti-SARS nu-
cleocapsid antibodies in an Old World species of horseshoe
bats in the genus Rhinolophus, with especially high combined
antibody/RNA prevalences in Rhinolophus sinicus and Rhi-
nolophus macrotis (67, 74, 122). Interestingly, high titers of
antibodies correlated with low levels of RNA, suggesting that
the viruses were actively replicating in these animals.
While neither team was able to successfully cultivate virus
from bat samples, sequencing efforts netted full-length ge-
nomes from all three of the sampling locations that yielded
positive samples. Bat SARS-like-CoVs (Bat-SCoVs) range in
genome size from 29,690 to 29,749 nt, making them similar in
genome length to SARS-CoV (29,727 nt), with nucleotide
identity ranging from 88 to 92% compared to that for SARS-
CoV (67, 74, 110). While most gene sequences shared high
identity (80 to 100%, with most genes in the range of 90 to
100%), distinct regions within nsp3, Spike (particularly the S1
domain), ORF3, and ORF8 were the most variable (see Fig.
1). Variations in these regions consisted of point mutations,
deletions, and insertions of both small and large regions of
sequence. These variations place Spike identity at 76 to 78%
(63% for the S1 domain) and ORF8 identity at 34% compared
to those for SARS-CoV. Of note, the 29-nt region in ORF8
present in palm civet and early human phase SARS-CoV iso-
lates was also present in Bat-SCoV sequences (26, 110). Ana-
lyses of nonsynonymous and synonymous substitution rates in
the Bat-SCoVs indicate that these viruses have not undergone
the positive selection pressure that would suggest a recent
species-crossing event. Conversely, these analyses suggest that
Bat-SCoVs have been evolving independently, presumably in
bat hosts, for a long time (110). Thus, these data suggest that
Old World horseshoe bats such as those in the Rhinolophus
genus serve as reservoir species for SARS-like coronaviruses.
It can also be speculated that similar species may harbor vi-
ruses with closer evolutionary relationships to the viruses that
infected civets, raccoon dogs, and then humans in the SARS
outbreak in 2002.
An examination of species-to-species conservation in the
ACE2 molecule further complicates the evolutionary picture.
Structural studies of hACE2 in complex with the RBD of
SARS-CoV identified 18 key ACE2 residues across three re-
gions of the protein that directly interface with the RBD (72)
(Fig. 4). While ACE2 molecules are well conserved on the
whole across mammalian species (at or above 90% homology),
homology across these interacting residues is not as well con-
served. It is puzzling that the mouse ACE2 interface, which
exhibits the lowest homology at these residues, supports infec-
tion with human epidemic strain SARS-CoV in an in vivo
model. Civet and bat interfaces possess similar homologies, yet
while cACE2-transfected cells support both civet and human
strain infections (120), neither cACE2- nor hACE2-trans-
fected cells support infection of Bat-SCoV unless it encodes
the human RBD (hRBD) (10 and unpublished data). In fact,
the region of Bat-SCoV that aligns with RBDs from human
and civet strains is markedly different, including several large
deletions across the RBM, the region corresponding to ACE2
interface residues (Fig. 3). Further, field studies of SARS-like-
CoV-positive bats show no evidence of replicating virus in
respiratory swabs (74). Certainly, these data do not address
structural changes that cannot be predicted with certainty from
homology modeling against the human molecular complex.
However, these dichotomies leave many questions unan-
swered. Do bats serve as a reservoir species for SARS-like
CoVs, with civets, raccoon dogs, and possibly other unidenti-
fied animals functioning as conduits, or are bats actually func-
tioning as the direct reservoirs of the human epidemic? Is there
an unidentified coreceptor for bat SARS-like CoVs that po-
tentiates the ACE2 interaction in bats, civets, or humans? Is
the mutational burden for a bat SARS-like CoV too great to be
overcome in a single conduit, or were multiple conduit species
involved in the establishment of the virulent strain in the hu-
man population? Finally, is the bat ACE2 molecule the bona
fide receptor for bat SARS-like CoVs and/or can these or-
thologs function as receptors for early human epidemic/civet
SARS strains? Clearly, more empirical studies are essential to
address these important questions.
FIG. 4. Comparison of ACE2 residues that directly interact with Spike RBD. Species comparisons of ACE2 molecules for human, African
green monkey (Chlorocebus aethiops), Himalayan palm civet (Paguma larvata), mouse (Mus musculus), and Chinese horseshoe bat (Rhinolophus
sinicus) are shown. ACE2 residue numbers are indicated above the graph. Residues that differ from those of the human sequence are highlighted
in blue. Residues that differ from but are homologous to human sequences are indicated in pink. Percent identity/homology to the human sequence
is indicated to the right (BLOSUM62 alignment). SARS-CoV Spike RBD residues shown to interact with human ACE2 residues (72) are indicated
at the bottom of each column. ACE2 residues shown to interact with Spike residues 479 and 487, which have demonstrated high relevance in host
range studies (75), are indicated in yellow.
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Bats constitute 20% of the mammalian population on Earth
and are the most divergent, widely distributed nonhuman
mammalian species (32). They have been implicated as reser-
voirs for a variety of diseases that affect humans, including
rabies, Hendra and Nipah virus infections, and potentially for
Ebola and Marburg virus infections (3, 4, 14, 36, 70, 94–96).
That bats have been shown to harbor more than 60 different
RNA viruses underscores the importance of developing re-
agents, including cell culture systems, for detection of viruses
that propagate in these animals (19, 46, 149).
CONCLUSIONS: THE POTENTIAL FOR REEMERGENCE
OF SARS-LIKE COVS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
PREVENTING THE UNKNOWN
While the primary human epidemic was quickly controlled
and potential host civets were culled as a preventative mea-
sure, there is increasing evidence that bat species serve as
reservoirs of not only SARS-like coronaviruses but also of
multiple strains of coronaviruses, some of which are compar-
atively close relatives of circulating human strains (27, 32, 40,
68, 104, 105, 132, 152). Bats, in fact, have come under in-
creased scrutiny as harbingers of RNA virus-mediated diseases
(149) and have been proposed as the ultimate reservoir of all
existing human strains of coronaviruses (32, 74). With a theme
distressingly reminiscent of the coinfection/reassortment mecha-
nisms employed by influenza virus, coinfections with phylogeneti-
cally distinct strains of coronaviruses have been reported in a
high proportion of sampled animals of the bat species Min-
iopterus pusillus in Hong Kong. These bats cohabit with other
Miniopterus species that harbor yet-more-distinct coronavirus
infections (27). Based on available evidence, it seems that the
question of emergence of another pathogenic human corona-
virus from bat reservoirs might be more appropriately ex-
pressed as “when” than as “if”. The main unknown factor
involves whether a newly emergent human coronavirus will be
susceptible to neutralization or control by any therapeutic or
vaccine measures developed against SARS-CoV isolates and
sequence data. Furthermore, the ease of bat-human or bat-
animal cross-species transmission should be thoroughly exam-
ined both by mutation-driven evolution and by RNA recombi-
nation-driven processes.
The current paradigm argues that the progenitor of SARS-
CoV was a bat virus that jumped into civets, where changes
were selected in the RBD that allowed for recognition of the
civet ACE2 as an intermediate host prior to transmission and
adaptation to the human host (Fig. 5A). This may well be the
case. However, phylogenetic studies also indicate that the ex-
isting bat strains are more closely related to early human epi-
demic strains, which alternatively suggests direct bat-human
transmission as the initial precursor event, followed by differ-
ential radiation within the two species (Fig. 5B). It is also
interesting that human strains that were characterized during
the epidemic maintained efficient hACE/cACE2 recognition,
yet in vitro-adapted civet strains rapidly gained hACE2 recog-
nition (120). These data suggest that efficient human/civet
ACE2 recognition was key for maintaining SARS-CoV in hu-
man populations, providing an animal reservoir for continued
persistence. If so, these data suggest that SARS-like viruses
were likely persisting and causing human disease prior to the
2002–2003 outbreak on a much smaller, but noteworthy, scale.
Detailed serologic studies on archived serum samples would
shed considerable insight into this possibility.
Since the Spike protein continually promotes itself as a prin-
cipal deciding factor in viral entry, it is perhaps logical to
presume that coronavirus vaccine and therapeutic strategies
should target the Spike protein and, in particular, the RBD.
Multiple studies have demonstrated the cross-neutralizing po-
tential of human monoclonal antibodies (neutralizing MAbs
[nMAbs]) raised against the SARS-CoV Spike and that the
vast majority of these epitopes map to the RBD (10, 47, 114,
123, 127, 162). Indeed, results showing that a neutralization-
resistant animal Spike regained susceptibility to nMAbs upon
adapting to human airway epithelia are encouraging (121).
However, in the face of mounting evidence that coronaviruses
are quite capable of shifting receptor affinity, an ability that
would most assuredly place them outside of the prohibitory
curtain of most nMAbs and perhaps of vaccines, it is becoming
increasingly evident that development of therapeutic avenues
and vaccines that target broader, more universally conserved
alleles and a variety of loci across phylogenetic subclusters is of
paramount importance, especially for emerging viruses that
originate from highly heterogeneous pools of precursor zoo-
notic viruses. Such a strategy has already been employed for
influenza virus, and a nMAb that recognizes a conserved re-
gion of the HA stem, rather than the receptor binding region,
has so far proven resistant to the development of escape mu-
tants (129).
Investigators face a daunting black box with emerging
viruses: the challenge of developing a universal therapeutic
agent to combat a genetically proficient virus that quite likely
has many more options for emergence than we have yet con-
sidered. In essence, the SARS-CoV outbreak and ecology re-
affirm the desperate need for innovative approaches for devel-
oping vaccines and therapeutics against zoonotic viruses that
exist in heterogenous, highly variant quasispecies pools. Fur-
FIG. 5. Paradigms for cross-species transmission of SARS-like
CoVs. Host species are represented by black boxes. Viral genomes are
represented by blue bars, and species-specific RBDs are indicated by
colored boxes: red, bat specific; purple, civet specific; green, human
(epidemic) specific. (A) The civet intermediate paradigm. The bat
reservoir progenitor virus was transmitted to civets, and a civet-specific
RBD was selected that facilitated transmission to humans. In humans,
the epidemic RBD was selected. (B) Direct bat-human paradigm.
Transmission from bats to humans occurred without an intermediate
host. Within the human population, selection for many RBDs resulted
in the propagation of both the epidemic RBD and other closely related
RBDs that could circulate within the civet population, maintaining an
animal reservoir for continued viral persistence.
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thermore, as a model of public health response to an emerging
respiratory virus, the response to the SARS-CoV outbreak
highlights the critical need to fine tune detection and diagnos-
tic mechanisms. It is postulated that all human coronaviruses
originated from bat strains (142). The likelihood that other
potentially lethal coronaviruses are harbored in bats suggests
that another outbreak could occur on a similar time scale to
that of the SARS-CoV outbreak, in which case response times
to emergent disease would have to be measured in months or
even weeks, not in years. Thus, the SARS-CoV outbreak serves
as a harbinger, underscoring the absolute necessity for the
development of platform strategies to rapidly counteract newly
emerging disease threats before they occur.
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